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REFORM TRENDS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
SPAIN, FRANCE AND ENGLAND & WALES 
RICHARD VOGLER* 
I would like to begin by expressing a very respectful dissent from other 
speakers who have referred to different “systems” of criminal justice. I 
would argue, on the contrary, that there are three great global 
methodologies of criminal justice which have become progressively 
integrated within different systems.1 First, is the adversarial method 
developed in the eighteenth century, which is strongly associated with due 
process, rights, and law. Second, is the inquisitorial method, which is 
much older and somewhat authoritarian, and which is based upon 
scientific and forensic inquiry in a very bureaucratic setting. The third 
method is popular participation in justice, which is characterized by 
pragmatism and common sense, and is currently represented in the jury 
system, but through other forms of popular participation as well. I would 
argue that these methodologies have historically inter-penetrated each 
other to such an extent that it is no longer possible for us to talk about 
distinct “systems.”  
I am going to concentrate on only one of these: adversariality. 
Although I will be looking specifically at Spain, France, and England, 
these countries are part of a worldwide movement towards adversariality. 
Since the Second World War we have seen adversariality sweeping across 
Western Europe, Latin America, the former Soviet Union, and into the 
international tribunals. This movement has been described as a 
transformation similar to the reception of Roman Law in the jus commune 
period;2 a transformation of such enormous importance that it is one of the 
most important cultural changes of our generation.  
I would like to talk about France and Spain together, largely because 
both derive their criminal justice systems from the Napoleonic Code 
d’Instruction Criminelle of 1808 and, therefore, have strong structural 
 * Richard Vogler is a solicitor and senior lecturer in law at the University of Sussex in 
England. He is also involved in international legal reform, most recently in Georgia, but in several 
other countries as well.  
 I would like to thank the American Society of Comparative Law and the University of Missouri in 
St. Louis and Washington University for their wonderful hospitality and for the organization of this 
conference.  
 1. For a more detailed analysis, see RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(Ashgate Aldershot ed., 2005) (forthcoming).  
 2. Wolfgang Weigand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229–48 
(1991). 
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similarities. Along with Belgium, they are the only major European 
countries to retain substantial elements of the pre-trial instruction 
procedure, which was abandoned in Germany in 1976 and in Italy in 1988. 
I am going to take a brief historical digression. In an uncharacteristic fit 
of Anglo-mania, the French adopted the English criminal justice system in 
its entirety during the Revolutionary period in 1791, including the radical 
new concept of adversariality, which was developed in England in the 
eighteenth century. After sixteen years of war with England, the French 
were probably less charitable toward us. So when we look at the 1808 
codification by Napoleon, we find that the pre-trial of the 1670 Code 
Louis, which involved highly authoritarian, secretive, inquisitorial 
processes, was reinstated and married to the adversarial English trial 
phase.3 Thus, the 1808 Code d’Instruction Criminelle is a deeply 
conflicted system based upon a hybridization of the former inquisitorial 
1670 pre-trial mode with the eighteenth-century English adversarial trial 
stage. Charles Ganilh, who was one of the revolutionaries opposed to this 
development, said,  
It is proposed to you to make this occult and treacherous procedure 
the foundation of the grand jury’s decision, and to infect our 
criminal procedure, one of the greatest blessings of the Revolution, 
with one of the greatest defects of the criminal procedure under the 
Monarchy! Such an impure mixture cannot be made . . . There can 
be no alliance between the oppressive forms of the Monarchy and 
the protective forms of the Republic. They are naturally repugnant 
to each other, and cannot concur in bringing about the same end.4 
Yet, this is exactly what happened in the 1808 codification. As Esmein 
put it, as the defendant proceeds through the system, he passes from 
obscurity into the full light of day. There, the procedure was secret, 
written, and always favorable to the prosecution in pre-trial. Here, 
everything is publicity, oral trial, free defense and full discussion in the 
trial.5  
It was just this Code d’Instruction Criminelle of 1808, a flawed and 
fundamentally oppressive hybrid, which has become the dominant form of 
trial around the world. Interestingly, the common law adversarial mode 
 3. See VOGLER, supra note 1, at 46–60. 
 4. ADHEMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO FRANCE 442–43 (John Murray ed., 1914). 
 5. Id. at 510. 
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flourished only in places where it was imposed by the British and nowhere 
else. New countries adopted the French Code largely, by translating it.  
I say it is a “flawed” code because, in my view, the hybridization 
produces some anomalous results. In particular, the pre-trial phase is 
preoccupied with compiling a written dossier, which becomes functionally 
irrelevant during the oral trial stage. Judges must also perform the 
competing roles of investigator and impartial guardians of the rights of 
those they investigate. A rights-based adversarial importation, such as the 
presumption of innocence, is logically incompatible with a decision-
making process based upon a forensic test of intime conviction (personal 
certainty) rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, enacted 
rights of silence become impossible, even subversive, in a pre-trial phase 
that depends upon a constant dialogue between the accused and state 
officials. In short, the domination of the official inquiry in the pre-trial 
successfully subverts and undermines the basic methodology of the oral 
adversarial trial stage.  
I say “oppressive” because the 1808 Napoleonic Code, with very little 
modification, proved to be the weapon of choice of European 
totalitarianism in the first half of the twentieth century, particularly in 
Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, where it needed very little reform to 
make it serviceable to them.6 In Vichy, France until 1944 and in Francoist 
Spain until 1975, the Napoleonic Code permitted Fascist militaries to 
manipulate and even dominate the ordinary processes of justice. Since that 
time, authoritarianism in the European justice system has proved much 
more intransigent and resistant to reform than political authoritarianism in 
Europe. This has particularly been the case in Spain and France, both of 
which have been among the slowest European countries since the last war 
to adopt due process reforms. For example, in Spain, as late as 1975, 
political defendants could be diverted to secret military courts, Tribunales 
de Orden Público. And at the same time the Spanish courts and judiciary, 
were dominated by the paramilitary police, and, therefore, by the army. 
The procedure in the courts was described as secretive, inquisitive, and 
summary. Similarly, in France during the 1960s Algerian crisis, military 
tribunals along Vichy lines, were re-established. Incredibly, for three 
decades thereafter, up to the 1990s, French police stations remained 
substantially unregulated by law and completely impenetrable by lawyers. 
However, in the last twenty-five years, these countries have made 
highly significant changes. The situation in Spain was transformed in the 
 6. VOGLER, supra note 1, at 62–89. 
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1980s, although, in France the changes took longer, which is surprising 
given France’s history of political liberty. Here, the changes did not come 
about until the decade of 1993 to 2004.  
I will start briefly with Spain. After the death of Franco, a new liberal 
constitution was enacted in 1978, which is hailed, rightly, as one of the 
most progressive in Europe, and includes provisions requiring oral trial. 
These provisions clearly conflicted with the criminal procedural law, a 
conflict that was slowly resolved by a series of organic laws between 1984 
and 1992. The incredible transformation of the Spanish system in that 
period is well illustrated by the Barbera & Messegué trials of 1981 to 
1994.7 The original 1981 trial was a summary bureaucratic affair 
conducted before a judge wearing a fascist party badge. The entire 
investigative file, including statements obtained through torture, was 
received into evidence without formally being read out in court. After a 
lengthy appeal process, the European Court of Human Rights condemned 
Spain for failing to respect the principles of orality and the presumption of 
innocence. The defendant was subsequently acquitted and compensated 
after a retrial in 1993, which was, according to some, adversarial and fair, 
and marked the immense distance traveled by Spain in that period. 
Between 1978 and 1983, a regime of rights at the police station was 
established; by 1986 the police were demilitarized. Habeas corpus was 
introduced in 1984. Finally, a system was set up for the representation of 
defendants at the police stage and in court shortly thereafter.  
These fundamental changes were violently opposed at the time and 
were highly contentious in Spain. They are only now beginning to settle 
in, and I doubt that more reform change is now possible. For example, the 
State Pact for the Reform of Justice of May 2001, which was the blueprint 
for further reforms to Spanish criminal justice, made no mention of 
adversariality and, unfortunately, delegated procedural rights to a fairly 
low priority. Emphasizing, in the first stage of reform, a more streamlined, 
abbreviated procedure.  
Opposition to the introduction of adversariality was even fiercer in 
France. In 1949, reforms were proposed by the distinguished jurist 
Donnedieu de Varbres, not unlike those later achieved in Italy and 
Germany, but were subsequently abandoned because of the level of 
official opposition. Forty years later, similar controversy attended the 
publication of the Human Rights Commission Report, under the direction 
 7. Barbera, Messegué, & Jabardo v. Spain, 11 E.H.R.R. 360 E.C.H.R. (1989). See Dennis P. 
Riordan, The Rights to a Fair Trial and to Examine Witnesses Under the Spanish Constitution and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373 (1999). 
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of Mireille Delmas-Marty, where the same kind of adversarial approach to 
the pre-trial was suggested. In 2002, French scholars still complained of 
the constant siren voices of the Anglo-Saxons, which were now becoming 
so clamorous that scarcely a day passed without the American criminal 
justice system being held up to us as an ideal model.8 There has been 
tremendous resistance to these “siren voices” in France, expressed most 
pithily by Madame Gigou, the former justice minister:  
The adversarial system of justice is by nature unfair and unjust. It 
favors the strong over the weak. It accentuates social and cultural 
differences, favoring the rich who are able to engage and pay for the 
services of one or more lawyers. Our own system is better both in 
terms of efficiency and the rights of the individual.9 
As previously mentioned, the police station was almost completely 
closed to lawyers until 1993, when representation was possible after 
twenty hours of detention. In regard to these reforms, the Minister of 
Justice announced, “I rejoice to see my country rejoin the community of 
civilized nations. This reform is a real revolution.”10 Unfortunately, the 
reforms were immediately largely overturned by the right-wing 
government that had come into power. It was not until 2000 that a French 
defendant could actually see a lawyer at the time of arrest and due process 
provisions were embedded in the system. Furthermore, the procedural 
code, as amended in 2000, announced at the outset that the new criminal 
procedure should be fair and adversarial. February of this year saw retreat, 
to some extent, from these provisions by extending the police phase and 
the provisions for exclusion of lawyers in organized crime cases. Yet, this 
exclusion also includes all homicides committed by more than one person 
and has made the police stage inaccessible to lawyers for periods of up to 
ninety-six hours in terrorism cases, and forty-eight hours in jointly-
committed homicide cases. There has been a great deal of controversy 
about this new procedure in France. The head of the Lille bar said 
recently, “Four days of police custody, that is four days of the Middle 
Ages, cut off from the world; that is incredible regression.”11 
So both countries have preserved the instruction procedure. Both 
countries have also made a vigorously contested attempt to introduce more 
 8. SERGE GUINCHARD, & JACQUES BUISSON, PROCÉDURE PÉNALE 143 (2000). 
 9. Jacqueline Hodgson, Codified Criminal Procedure and Human Rights: Some Observations 
on the French Experience, CRIM. L. REV. 165–82, 175–76 (2003). 
 10. LE MONDE, Dec. 21, 1992, at 6. 
 11. LIBÉRATION, Feb. 11, 2004. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p631 Vogler book pages.doc10/28/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
636 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:631 
 
 
 
 
adversariality and perhaps have achieved a degree of success by firmly 
entrenching a rights regime in the pre-trial, particularly regarding a 
defendant’s right to have access to lawyers. Unfortunately, there have been 
recent attempts to turn back from this progress. 
In England and Wales, the situation is different. England and Wales 
have had an adversarial system for much longer. What we see in England 
and Wales is the move to what I call “third-stage adversariality.” In the 
period since the Second World War, we have lawyerized our pre-trial, 
created a professional prosecution service, and entrenched a network of 
pre-trial procedural rights under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 
1984. 
As I have indicated, there has been a considerable reaction since that 
time, but I think the 1984 Act was a major achievement for us, echoing 
many of the advances which were established by the Warren Court here in 
the United States in the 1960s. It was created largely by the lawyer’s 
colonization of the pre-trial in the post-war period following from the 
developments of mass legal aid. In our case, indigent defence, is 
conducted not by public defenders but by publicly-funded private lawyers. 
In the 1960s and 1970s in the UK lawyers poured into the pre-trial stage 
and created a competitive market. They overturned the 1912 Judge’s Rules 
which had hitherto provided only very limited regulation of the pre-trial. 
Partly as a result of a number of miscarriages of justice cases and the 
Royal Commission in 1981, a completely new regime of rights was 
established in our pre-trial. These include codified rights on arrest and 
detention, stop and search, fairness of interrogation, conduct at the police 
station, and videotaping of interrogations. This new regime put in place a 
network of procedural rights that has—in my experience having worked as 
an advocate during that period—completely revolutionized our pre-trial. In 
many ways, I would hold the current regime up as a model, despite recent 
problems such as cuts to legal aid. 
Taken as a whole, I think we can see the new pre-trial regime, created 
between 1984 and the enactment of the Human Rights Act in 1998 in 
England, as an important national achievement. Aware that the main 
provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 were 
irreversible, senior police and conservative allies are now attempting to 
reintroduce elements of compulsion on the accused, which one would 
associate with more inquisitorial methodologies. For example, the right of 
silence, despite two Royal Commissions that advocated its retention, was 
significantly qualified by the Section 34 of the 1994 Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act, which permitted adverse inferences to be drawn in court 
when defendants rely on facts not disclosed to the police. Fortunately, it is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/12
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now clear from the empirical research that this measure has had very little 
practical effect. The same could be said of the changes introduced by 
Section 5 of the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act of 1996. This 
section requires the defense to alert the prosecution to the general lines of 
defense. We all thought, at the time, this was an absolute catastrophe. In 
fact, the judges have not rigorously enforced these provisions against the 
defence.  
So, in respect of this brief tour d’horizon of reform in Western Europe, 
I would say that the changes that have occurred since the Second World 
War have been hugely important and were driven both by the American 
hegemony in law and legal practice as well as the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights. But, I would not necessarily 
characterize this as an Americanization of European criminal practice. I 
think that, to a certain extent, we are going back to our historical roots in 
the Enlightenment, because the ideas about adversariality emerged 
specifically from the European Enlightenment. They were destroyed by 
European totalitarianism in the first half of the twentieth century, but they 
are now experiencing a clear revival. And despite current problems, such 
as the war on terror, which is having a serious impact, these are 
momentous developments with far-reaching implications for our 
democracies and we should welcome them warmly. 
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